Public Financial Accountability Institutions and Democratic Governance in Nigeria by Olubunmi, Apeloko D. & Adesopo, A. A.
1 ISSN 1712-8056[Print]
ISSN 1923-6697[Online]
   www.cscanada.net
www.cscanada.org
Canadian Social Science
Vol. 13, No. 11, 2017, pp. 1-12
DOI:10.3968/9977
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Public Financial Accountability Institutions and Democratic Governance in 
Nigeria
Apeloko D. Olubunmi[a],*; A. A. Adesopo[b]
[a]Ph.D., Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo 
University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. 
[b]Professor, Department of Public Administration, Obafemi Awolowo 
University, Ile-Ife Nigeria. 
*Corresponding author.
Received 15 September 2017; accepted 7 November 2017 
Published online 26 November 2017
Abstract
The study is based on the examination of the impact 
of public financial accountability and the pursuit to 
develop democratic governance in Nigeria between 
1999 and 2013. It compared the state of financial 
accountability institutions and their contributions to the 
consolidation of democratic governance in some selected 
states. The study utilised both primary and secondary 
sources of data collection. Descriptive and inferential 
statistics were used to analyse the data collected. The 
study revealed that financial accountability institutions 
performed significant roles in consolidating democratic 
governance in the selected states (x2 = 113.97; p < 0.05), 
by ensuring the enhancement of transparent financial 
dealing (70.7%), proper execution of projects by MDAs 
(81.6%), popular support for government (76%), general 
participation of the citizens (60.6%) and peaceful co-
existence (88.7%). The study concluded that there were 
reforms in financial accountability institutions and 
mechanisms in all the sampled states through which 
democratic consolidation was ensured at different 
degrees between 1999 and 2013.  
Key words:  Public financial accountability; 
Accountability; Governance and development
Olubunmi, A. D., & Adesopo, A. A. (2017). Public Financial 
Accountabi l i ty  Inst i tut ions and Democrat ic  Governance in 
Nigeria .  Canadian Social  Science,  13 (11) ,  1-12.  Avai lable 
from: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/9977 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/9977
INTRODUCTION
The single most worrisome problem of most African 
states was governance vis-a-vis lack of accountability. 
Though, the body narrowly conceived the concept to 
mean exercise of political power to conduct the affairs of 
the state (World Bank, 1989) to the neglect of economic 
and social dimension which the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF, 2007) attempts to address in its definition to 
capture development requirements of states around the 
world. In this regard, and, by implication, it is believed 
that a great part of Nigeria’s problem is the absence of 
opposition or strong counteracting power as well as 
institutional mechanisms to call public officials to be 
accountable for every resources (finance) that has accrued 
to them in the course of their service to the citizenry. This 
is largely because politics is personalized: patronage is 
considered to be important to the exercise of power as 
leadership assumes broad unrestricted authority and also 
loses its legitimacy along the line. In addition, information 
is controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or 
disbanded. In an attempt to bring these imbroglios under 
control, government and the civil societies, between 1999 
and 2013, attempted and actually built different institutions 
and stimulated good number of reforms, especially in the 
management of public finances. 
The realization that part of the most important 
functions of governments is management and control of 
public resources further propelled the institutionalization 
of certain measures to enthrone definite modalities 
for engendering transparent financial dealings and 
public service restructuring. The integrity of public 
financial management and procurement arrangements 
do not only affect the level of trust citizens have in 
their governments, but also, fundamentally determines 
the interactions/relationships that exist among policy, 
development and the quest to consolidate democracy. 
Transformational leaders realize that a country’s 
competitiveness in the world, its ability to attract 
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foreign investors, and its cost of borrowing are affected 
by the quality of the core public financial activities 
(Ladipo et al., 2009) as typical condition that can affect 
consolidation of democratic governance all together. 
Within this expectation, certain schemes have been 
advanced by Ladipo et al. (2009) as fundamental 
measures to create efficient management of public 
resources with the hope of advancing the course of 
consolidating democratic governance: 
(a) comprehensive and transparent legal frameworks for public 
financial management and procurement; (b) institutional 
frameworks made up of agencies with clearly defined 
responsibilities and adequate numbers of suitably qualified 
professional staff; (c) leadership that takes seriously its 
accountability for efficient management of public resources; (d) 
procurement arrangements that are supportive of governments’ 
strategic goals and that are based on explicit principles of 
economy, efficiency, competition, and transparency; and 
(e) independent scrutiny, including from civil society, of 
governments’ stewardship of public resources. (p.ix)
The scholar (Ladipo et al.) believes that the issue 
surrounding the consolidation of democracy and the quest 
to have accountable public office holders go beyond 
participation of citizens in electoral activities. That is, 
participation in democracy is far beyond the ritualistic 
activity of voting; it equally embraces active participation 
of all citizens in the totality of national life (Yorom, 1994) 
to ensure that their living standard is raised. Hence, there 
is an appeal by scholars for the erection of structures or 
institutions through which people can be mobilized to 
participate in public affairs and provide reasonable checks 
on the activities of the major actors. 
Accountability and democratic governance have 
acquired diverse colorations within and among nations 
around the world at different stages of historical epoch. 
Thus, numerous postulators of the subject matter of 
democracy have identified some variables such as; 
institutions, issues, values, process as well as conditions 
that can influence democracy. Some of these debates 
support democracy-peace doctrine, development-
democracy/democracy-development thesis, democracy 
participation predicament, to mention but a few. 
At the participation period, democratic governance 
discourse acquired a unique dimension, which is the 
advocacy for the perspective of active citizen participation 
and how it can inform habits of civil engagement, build 
trust and facilitate the rule of law, enhance society’s 
monitoring capacity and elite accountability, and control 
corruption (Grzegorz & Grnymala-Busse, 2007). It 
appears axiomatic that the constant drum of agitation 
for the enthronement and consolidation of democratic 
governance in Nigeria has largely been to stamp-out 
corruption, given the quest to have a participatory, 
open and transparent process of financial management. 
Implicitly, financial mismanagement has the capacity to 
create hardship, political apathy, civil unrest and even 
determination on the part of the citizen to also engage in 
corrupt practices. Review of literatures on the possibility 
of relationship between the two concepts brings to 
fore the fact that scholars usually focus on voting/
electoral accountability and the prospect of its impact 
on consolidation of democratic crusade with minimal 
attention being given to institutional and policy-based 
public financial accountability as a tool to ensure the 
same. 
The inherent lapses of voting accountability become 
apparent in the democratic process during the period 
between elections. That is, it stimulates a question on 
whether misbehaving public office holder can only be 
held accountable during the election when he would have 
completely looted the treasury of the state. In the case 
of Nigeria, some of the popular institutions that were 
created after 1999 were not resident and naturally part 
of their financial operations. Among those institutions 
that are naturally operation in the states include the 
office of Accountant General, office of Auditor General, 
State houses of Assembly and Ministry of Finance. Most 
empirical studies have not given due attention to all 
these institutions as veritable tools to curb corruption and 
financial mismanagement. Hence, this study is targeted at 
addressing this gap by looking at the working interaction 
among the mentioned institutions as a measure to curtail 
financial impropriety. 
The main focus of this study is to look at the 
institutional arrangements and policy choices that were 
resident in some selected states (Osun, Ogun and Ekiti 
States) in Nigeria which underpinned the management 
of public finances and public service as well as the 
implication for the consolidation of democracy. This was 
done by mediating in the general assumption which states 
that a well-managed public finance will stimulate adequate 
execution of budgeted projects, protect procurement 
process from manipulations and in the long run cut cost 
of public administration hence engender a meaningful 
welfare condition for the citizens.
1. CONCEPT CLARIFICATION
1.1 Economic Governance
The general idea of economic governance shows that it 
is the system of institutions and procedures established 
in view of achieving some objectives in the economic 
area, namely the coordination of economic policies for 
the promotion of economic and social progress for the 
citizens (Zoppe, 2013). Other scholars have not only 
attempted to define the term, efforts have equally been 
made to advance the need for governance of the economic 
base. Prufer (2012) identifies the need for mechanisms/
institutions that can tackle the problem that usually 
emanates from impersonal exchange (trade beyond an 
individual’s immediate circles of acquaintances) which he 
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noted to be the main catalyst for economic governance. 
Along this line, Dixit (2009) appraises economic 
governance to mean “the structure and the functioning 
of the legal and social institutions that support economic 
activities and economic transaction by protecting property 
right, enforcing contract and taking collective action to 
provide physical and organizational infrastructure”. This 
proposition focuses on institutional and legal application 
to the protection of property rights, enforcement of 
contract and taking collective action as a typical step 
to the advancement of infrastructural projects and to 
consequently generate an enviable economic height in the 
face of globalization.
To reduce the burden which globalization has inflicted 
on economic governance in the developing nations, a 
great deal of efforts have constantly emanated from 
international financial bodies to empower these states 
to have action-oriented mechanisms for sound financial 
resources mobilization vis-a-vis the intention to attain 
sustainable development. While all efforts of scholars 
have not tended toward the same direction on the roles 
that national government should play in the course of 
ensuring good economic governance, most national 
governments have embraced some of the postulated 
policy recommendations as blue prints to fine-tune their 
economies. These policy frameworks are summarized 
thus: Reduction in extravagant expenditure, higher 
spending on primary education and social protection for 
the poor and unemployed, creation of level playing field 
for the private sector, stronger banking sector, reform of 
tax system and greater transparency and accountability 
(UN, 2000). The highlighted elements also amount to 
the basic scope of viable economic governance. Hence, 
“effective economic governance” entails well structured, 
harmonious and complementary fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies and establishment of monitoring and regulatory 
authorities for the promotion and condition of different 
economic activities (Ibid).
Emanating from the above discussions are three 
fundamental conditioning factors of economic governance; 
effective economic policies, adequate institutional and 
regulative framework and efficient and well-trained 
administration. This conception tends to overlook the 
idea of government and governance as core elements of 
good economic governance but, a critical look at the same 
shows that the mentioned elements are product of political 
process keenly based on good governance. In fact, 
nearly all the writers of good governance have included 
economic benefits as a major output of good governance. 
Another school of thought posits that sound economic 
governance is a pre-requisite for the attainment of good 
governance. What is important is a noteworthy fact that 
there exists an interlocking and mutually reinforcing 
relationship between the two terms.
Certain number of fundamental requirements were 
highlighted by UN (2002) and Bradford (2003) as pre-
conditions for economic governance: promotion 
of private sector; encouragement of Public Private 
Partnership (PPP); regulatory frameworks; establishment 
of monitoring authorities; institutionalization of 
harmonious fiscal,  monetary and trade policies; 
autonomy for Central Bank; institutionalization of 
planning authority. Nearly all these recommendations 
have received attention from Nigerian Government since 
the inception of the current republic. For instance a great 
chunk of responsibilities have been tailored to grow PPP, 
build institution and to cede power to the private sector 
via privatisation, as the major engine in the progressive 
wheel of the new era of economic governance. All 
these recommendations favor and support the age 
long advocacy for limited government and consistent 
adoption of market-friendly development strategies and 
fundamentally change the role of the government from 
“owner and operator to policy maker, facilitator and 
regulator” (UN, 2002; Mile-Kahler, 2004). Functional 
market and weaker government are further being made 
possible by three fundamental trends of globalization, 
privatisation and deregulation (UN, 2002; Kahler, 2004; 
Bradford, 2003).
The recent call for active and rigorous administrative 
programme is targeted at tackling certain identifiable 
social milieus. In addition, these dwell on issues that 
affect and shape the focus of economic governance from 
the perspectives of poverty reduction, eradication of 
diseases, improvement in the educational sector, creation 
of job opportunity, rehabilitation and training of labour, 
to mention but a few (UN, 2002). Among numerous 
factors that are capable of provoking a lasting strategic 
solution to these identified imbroglios is the call for 
restructuring in the administrative set up to make it more 
effective, efficient and responsive to the extent that it can 
engage in the management of finances particularly and 
the active developmental project in general. The later can 
further be complemented by institutionalizing measures 
against tax evasion, for fiscal policies and proper 
financial management. In so doing, constant requests 
have been made for participation and accountability as 
well as outstanding “professionalism by attracting bright, 
energetic, visionary people” (Ibid). The accountability 
measures vis-a-vis good economic governance and 
administrative arena will help in curbing corruption which 
is adjudged to be the greatest single problem of any quest 
to advance and grow (UN, 2002; Agbaje, 1996; Gboyega, 
1996; Maduagwu, 1996; Ogbam-Iyam; 1996, Oyebode, 
1996).
1.2 Accountability 
A review of the concept of accountability is shrouded 
with confusion and controversy because of its endlessness 
and personalized justifications that authors usually 
display. Accountability is used as an alternative for 
many loosely defined political desires, such as good 
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governance, transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, 
responsiveness, responsibility, and integrity (Mulgan, 
2000; Behn, 2001; Dubnick, 2007). The pursuit by 
scholars to come with their own definition of the concept 
of accountability has created what Boven (2007) called 
“disconnection”. This is to the extent that chapters 
in a book on accountability do not agree on its core 
definitional attributes. Hence, readers are left with the 
choice of drowning in the ocean of confusion in the quest 
to find solution to an already complicated academic 
expedition. 
Boven (2007) avers that some use the concept very 
loosely, others produce a more narrow definition, but few 
of these definitions are fully compatible, which makes 
it very hard to produce cumulative and commensurable 
research. In addition, a small number of studies move 
beyond conceptual and theoretical analyses and engage 
in systematic, comparative empirical research and 
philosophical ground (Adelberg & Batson, 1978; Tetlock, 
1983; 1985; Makinde, 2003).
Regrettably, no attempt is usually made to provide 
a consistent analytical template for the analysis of this 
accountability crisis. Most authors define accountability 
in different ways and therefore address very different 
accountability dilemmas, practices, and potential crises 
(Boven, 2007).
The pedigree of the term can be further understood by 
appealing to its philosophical underpinnings as advanced 
by early Philosophers like Mill’s utilitarianism, Kant’s 
categorical imperative and Awolowo’s peoples’ republic, 
(Makinde, 2003). Drawing from Kant’s admonition 
of a universally acceptable code of conduct for men, 
Makinde (2003) avers that public servant should act 
in a way that their actions could be universalized 
and worthy of emulation through their  honesty, 
integrity, probity, transparency and accountability. 
The shortcoming of Kant’s thesis lies in its abnormal 
formality, which makes it unachievable. The utilitarian 
principle of Mill also constitutes another realm in the 
foundational philosophical hypothesis of the concept 
of accountability. The focus of the utilitarian idea 
is “the greatest good of the greatest number” which 
received volume from the analysis of Makinde (2003) 
when she avers that “corruption such as looting of the 
public treasury by public office holders is unethical”. 
According to her, accountability will orchestrate a proper 
public spending and increase the greatest good for the 
greatest number of citizens in the long run. Also, one 
can criticize the utilitarian ethos for its glorification of 
minority insensitivity. That is, it supports the promotion 
of the interest of those who constitute the majority to the 
neglect of the minority groups. 
Having agreed that accountability is without bound, 
four basic yardsticks are adopted in this study to build a 
definitional boundary for its understanding. This ranges 
from virtue to mechanism and internal (vertical) to external 
values (horizontal) (O’Connel, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 
2007; Boven, 2007; Carrington et al., 2008).  
Appealing to pragmatic application through American 
academic and political dialogue, accountability is used 
mainly as a normative concept, as a set of standards 
for the evaluation of the behaviour of public actors. 
Accountability or, more precisely, ‘being accountable’, is 
seen as a virtue, as a positive quality of organizations or 
officials. Along this path, accountability studies usually 
focus on normative matters vis-a-vis on the assessment of 
the active behaviour of public agents (Boven, 2007). This 
justification is problematic because of lack of universal 
agreement on what constitutes accountable behavior. But 
in ameliorating this problem, O’Connell (2005) opines 
that accountability was present when public services 
have a high quality, at a low cost and are performed 
in a courteous manner. Koppell (2005) identifies five 
different dimensions of accountability along this line thus 
– transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, 
and responsiveness. A response to Koppell (2005) 
shows that the type of organization and the institutional 
context also determine the applicability of the mentioned 
variables because many of the defining elements, such 
as transparency, responsibility, and responsiveness, are 
each symbolic and independent concepts themselves, 
which need thorough deliberation. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to arrive at a single definition or standard for 
public accountability as a virtue, as standards will vary 
across a range of public organizations, political systems, 
and perspectives. Nevertheless, it is evident that those 
mentioned variables could channel direction to understand 
and reduce the burden of definition of the term within the 
range under study. It must also be said that this justification 
explains the internal model of accountability that is usually 
encapsulated in the principle of hierarchical structure of 
an organization where the order flows from the top and 
accountability is expected from the subordinate to the 
superior.
In Australian and European scholarly debates, 
accountability is often used in a narrower and descriptive 
sense. That is, accountability is seen as a mechanism 
or institutional relation and arrangement in which an 
actor could be made to account for his behavior (Day & 
Klein, 1987; Mulgan, 2003; Bovens 2007). Implicitly, 
the direction of accountability studies is not toward 
the appraisal of the behavior of public agents, but the 
way in which constituted institutional arrangements 
function. And the focus of accountability studies is 
not whether the agents have acted in an accountable 
way, but whether they are or can be held accountable 
ex post facto by accountability forums (Boven, 2007). 
This dimension was traced to 1085 when King William 
I enjoined all the landowners to give account of every 
property in their custody (Dubnick, 2007). This literarily 
links accountability to account giving or book-keeping. 
Boven (2007) defines accountability in this sense as a 
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“relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her 
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, 
and the actor may face consequences”. This explains the 
external paradigm of accountability where institutions, 
elections, agencies, media, labor unions, to mention but a 
few.
Complementarily, the internal and external variances 
of accountability principles were given further eulogy, 
a succinct and epigrammatic picture viz: “External 
accountability requires state openness to scrutiny 
by the public and by outsiders, such as international 
organizations and nonprofits organizations. Meanwhile, 
“internal accountability involves the use of state 
institutions to limit incentives for corruption” (Rose-
Ackerman, 2007, p.182). The analysis so far has brought 
to fore the fact that accountability can assume different 
colorations and operates in diverse environments; private 
and public. The latter is the concern of this study.
2 .  B A C K G R O U N D  T O  P U B L I C 
ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES IN NIGERIA 
The long year of military dictatorship in Nigeria had 
distorted normalcy before civilian government took over 
in 1999. In his address at the swearing-in ceremony of 
Ministers in Abuja on 30th June, 1999, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo profusely lamented the pathetic state of the 
Nigerian economy, calamitous political chauvinism, 
plummeted standard of living and a deteriorated public 
service. Adegoroye (2006) identifies ten (10) indices 
that encapsulate the woes that Nigeria inherited from 
the military regimes. These are  “economic downturn, 
decay and near  col lapse of  social  and physical 
infrastructure, impairment of public sector management, 
poor economic management, high unemployment, low 
investor confidence, widespread corruption, excruciating 
debt overleap, high poverty and lack of confidence in 
government” (Adegoroye, 2006, p.12). Ayeni (2008, 
p.5) identifies the deficiencies in Nigeria’s public 
service advocating for critical reforms to ameliorate the 
challenges. According to him, 
the public service [in Nigeria] faces enormous problems and 
challenges which must be addressed; a reform service is key 
to meeting the development challenges of the 21st century; 
Nigeria’s dream of a better future can only be realized by 
modernizing the machinery of government- the public service; 
and reform provides the platform for applying a combination of 
strategies and approaches to resolve the crisis of governance and 
underdevelopment.
The reality of the changing world characterized by 
globalization and democratic governance with pressure 
being exerted on public service is a pointer to the 
externalized propelling factors. Hence, the accompanied 
responses could be viewed from internal and external 
mechanisms that Nigerian government opted for 
vis-a-vis the establishment of National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
as well as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The main objectives of these strategic responses were 
to re-engineer and streamline government and private 
machineries, so that a significant increase in the quality, 
quantity and cost-effectiveness of public service can be 
attained (Ayeni, 2008).
Emanating from the policy objectives of NEPAD 
are four fundamental thematic areas that Adegoroye 
(2006) christens as democratic and political governance, 
economic governance, corporate governance and socio-
economic governance. That is, to be able to guarantee the 
attainment of NEPAD’s objectives which involve, among 
others, the eradication of poverty; halting of conflicts; 
accelerating regional cooperation; generating capacity 
to harness the gains of globalization, those thematic 
missions must be accomplished. In the same vein, MDGs, 
which is the initiative of the United Nations, created some 
outlines of commitments that members must achieve 
before 2015. At the center of the body’s focus is the idea 
of empowerment via education, health and reduction of 
mortality rate. In addition, the establishment of NEEDS in 
2003 as a framework for the integration of all initiatives 
within Nigerian polity was for the purpose of promoting 
good governance and to facilitate development vis a vis 
the quest to empower citizens, promote private enterprise 
and change the operational paradigm of government 
(Aiyede, 2011). 
There is no doubt in the fact that the policy and 
objectives of the frameworks that were identified above 
(NEEDS, NEPAD and MDGs) properly capture the key 
contents of Nigeria’s imbroglios and the means to proffer 
solution to them though, with many constraints. Most 
importantly on the issue of constraints are “lack of public 
accountability arising from the use of oil revenues, weak 
state-society relations, patronage politics, a personalised 
rather than institutionalised policy process, the ever 
present threat of conflict, and value systems that have 
promoted short-term behaviour and opportunism” 
(Utomi et al., 2007). Hence, requirement for reform 
became paramount. This resolution provoked countless 
number of institutional building/reforms, policy outline, 
establishment of service charter and institution of due 
process modalities, to ensure that the very essence of 
accountability is attained given the need to consolidate 
democratic governance.
3. INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY
In Aiyede’s (2011) view, an institution is an enduring 
collection of formal laws and informal rules, norms, 
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customs, codes of conduct and organized practices that 
shape and govern human interaction. The contradiction 
or conflicts between formal and informal institutions or 
behaviours usually necessitate institutional reforms. In 
addition, the case of the emergence of illegal or amoral 
disposition in public offices mostly propels the creation/
building of a new institutions or structures. It must be 
emphasized that institutional reform is more than just 
“modernizing” institutions; it encompasses the fostering 
of dynamic synergy with civil societies and private sector 
(Aiyede, 2011). Behind the desire and constant call for 
progressive comradeship among state actors are the goal 
of strengthening the paradigms through which the public 
sector is managed by modulating concerned organisations, 
performance, and conditions of employees. It sometimes 
also entails downsizing, effective or judicious use of 
scarce resources to achieve huge outcome, curbing/
curtailing poor decision making processes, management 
of staff welfare conditions, and boosting of weakened 
accountability designs (Ibid.).
At the point when the realization to position the 
Nigerian Public Service for the mission of reform 
projects, the government organized series of retreats for 
Ministers, Special Advisers and Permanent Secretaries 
between 1999 and 2001. Notable among these retreats 
was the fourth Presidential retreat in Kuru, Jos which gave 
birth to the Kuru Declaration with series of statement 
of commitments, national ideology and codes of ethics 
for public officers. To place the Public Service in a 
perspective where they will be able to handle public sector 
reforms, a proposal to establish the Bureau of Public 
Service Reform (BPSB) was submitted to the President 
in September 2003. The government established the 
Bureau in 2004 with the appointment of Goke Adegoroye 
as the pioneer Director. The BPSR was saddled with 
the following responsibilities: To initiate action plans; 
elucidate government policies on reforms; coordinate, 
monitor and evaluate reform implementation activities; 
conducting research and implementation; advise; engender 
a learning atmosphere among MDAs; dissemination of 
information; and submit quarterly reports on reforms 
activities (BPSR, 2004).
In a general term, concrete public service reforms that 
were found to be in operation within the period under 
study were highlighted under five principal headings 
(Adegoroye, 2006; Ayeni, 2008). The first categorization 
can be christened institutional structure for reform 
implementation which entails the following:
●	Budget	at	the	Budget	Office
●	Public	Procurement	at	the	BMPU
●	Accounting	and	Audit	at	OAGF	and	OAuGF
●		Tax	reforms	at	 the	Federal	Inland	Revenue	Service	
(FIRS)
●		Information	Technology	 and	 e-government	 at	
NITDA and SIJDA
●		Parts	and	customs	reforms	at	the	Nigerian	Customs	
Service
●	Anti-corruption	at	ICPC
●	Economic	and	Financial	crime	at	EFCC
●	Judicial	reform	at	the	Judiciary
●	Public	service	reforms	at	BPSR	
All these arrangements were further subsumed under 
four key areas thus: budgeting and financial management 
embracing procurement system, institutionalization of 
fiscal responsibility and accounting reforms. The second 
is the accountability reform, which entails the institution 
of due process, transparency and accountability in 
government transactions, establishment of service charters 
and institutionalization of compliance enforcement. The 
second stage just mentioned constitutes the focus of the 
study which includes the various identified mechanisms 
for its attainment. 
Third, there is human resource management aspect 
of the reform with certain modalities for achieving the 
same: personnel record and payroll clearing, staff cadre 
reviews, remodeling the recruitment and promotion 
pattern, installation of new performance management 
scheme, professionalism, pay return as a strategic plan of 
action, capacity development and training and changes 
in organizational culture. Operation and systems, which 
constitute the fourth aspect, involves organizational 
restructuring and right-sizing, work process re-design and 
ICT application. As earlier noted, the strength and focus 
of this study are drawn from the accountability issue, 
which will henceforth be given a systematic and thorough 
analysis under different headings. Equally, it must be 
reiterated that the discussion of accountability would 
largely cover how it can be achieved within the operation 
of financial management for the purpose of democratic 
consolidation in Nigeria at large and particularly in some 
selected states (Ogun, Osun and Ekiti States) in the 
Southwestern Nigeria.
4. NEXUS BETWEEN ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: 
EXPLORATION OF MULTIFACETED 
VIEWS
Accountability measures and its attending focus on 
the pursuit to cob corruption has remained one of the 
characteristics of any meaningful democratization crusade. 
Hence, it is useful to note that widespread corruption 
inflicts significant costs on countries making a transition 
to democracy and at the stage where it is required to 
ensure the deepening of certain sustainable democratic 
ethos. Following the assertion of Maduagwu (1996), 
the two most important obstacles to democratization in 
Nigeria have been military and corruption. At least, the 
demise of military autocracy in Nigeria has automatically 
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enthroned corruption as the only fear to fear along the 
path to ensure that democratic values are deepened. In this 
regard, Rose-Ackerman (2007) opines that government 
corruption involves the illegal use of public power for 
private or political gain. According to him, this can 
manifest in various guises viz: 
Public officials with the power to dispense benefits or impose 
costs may use their positions corruptly aggressively to seek 
private advantage or accept covert payments offered by private 
actors. Corruption may be an occasional exception to the rule of 
law or a routine aspect of the way officials, politicians, and the 
private sector deal with each other. The problem is most serious 
when payoffs and self-dealing are an integral part of the way a 
system works. In such cases, the occasional “big case” designed 
to punish a “bad apple” is not sufficient; more fundamental 
reforms are needed to restructure the relationships between the 
public and private sectors.
The appraisal of corruption above was not an attempt to 
reflect the totality of all that is embedded in the concept 
but, it captures the major concern of this study which 
involves diversion of public assets for personal use, dis-
regard for supremacy of fundamental operational rules, 
and politicization of compliance demand activities. 
Scholars like Rose-Ackerman (2007), Mauro (1995), Wei 
(2000), and Friedman, (2000) have alluded to the negative 
effects that corrupt practices can bestow upon states that 
desire a sustainable height in the ladder of democratic 
governance. Their comments parade issues like limitation 
of economic growth via distortion of foreign direct 
investment, encouragement of growth of illegal businesses 
which sometimes undermines the capacity of the state 
to collect taxes and enforce regulatory and expenditure 
plans with justice, and they challenge the legitimacy of 
the democratic experiment by reducing public trust in 
government (Rose-Ackerman, 2007). Citizens may begin 
to view all political participants as tainted and hence may 
limit their involvement in the project of state-building 
by turning to entirely private concerns. Indeed, such 
disheartened citizens may also engage in corrupt practices 
out of sarcasm and hopelessness. 
The foregoing has established the fact that the 
relationship between accountability and democratic 
governance is not accident given a mutually reinforcing 
interaction that underlines the same. In the scheme of 
interaction between the two concepts, one finds out 
that the meeting point revolves around the need to 
tackle corruption and other public indisciplines. In this 
case, the focus is on deepening the democratic values 
via accountability vis-a-vis the pursuit to eradicate 
corrupt practices. In line with this study, the kind of 
governmental inadequacies that are of consequential 
values to the breeding of corruption include buying of 
goods and services, distribution of subsidies, organization 
of privatization of state firms, provision of concessions 
(Rose-Ackerman, ibid) and the management of public 
finance. Della-Porta and Vannucci (1999) voiced this 
fact aloud by alluding to how unqualified firms enjoy to 
manipulate the process of a contract (and privatization 
processes) to their advantage. 
The realization that excellent investors into a 
reasonable business would not tender in an atmosphere 
that lacks accountability, and joined with the fact that 
potentiality of lack of accountability destroys the value 
of the exercise, and possibly fuel resentment. Hence, 
government pledged to ensure that everyone, including 
foreign investors, should be able to find out what 
happened to them in dialogue with the government 
agencies. To this end, regular press updates were 
promised to be organized in Nigeria and overseas 
to intimate members of the investing public of the 
happenings. The outcome of the exercise counteracted 
any intention to enthrone accountability. Scholars 
of different status have lamented about the unequal 
implementation paradigms, shrouded in corrupt dealings, 
which characterize the entire privatization business in 
Nigeria (Corradetti, 1999; Igbuzor, 2003; Ibrahim, 2012; 
Nwogwugwu, 2011). 
Much low-level corruption involves households 
that seek to qualify for government benefits such as 
subsidized housing, welfare payments, medical care, 
or university admissions into universities. Some of 
these anomalies usually occur when the benefit is too 
low to satisfy those who qualify or when officials 
are compelled to consult their initiative in the course 
of allocation of resources (Rose-Ackerman, 2007). 
Among the numerous damages that can ensue from 
these imbroglios is the social damage of inefficiency 
as a result of corruption which will enable the highest 
bribe giver and most scrupulous individual/firm to win a 
contract to the chagrin of the populace. In fact, the risks 
of giving and accepting payoffs will decrease and people 
will be largely deterred from thwarting normalcy by 
putting in place some internal and external measures to 
curb corruptions (Rose-Ackerman, 2002, pp.52-59). But, 
enforcement strategies need to be supplemented both 
with structural reforms that limit corrupt opportunities 
and with changes in public and business norms. It is 
within this accountability mechanism and the impacts 
on economic development that the nexus between 
accountability and democracy is discussed. 
The  in te rac t ions  tha t  have  ex is ted  be tween 
accountability and democracy right from the Athenian 
origin of the latter are of the essence for pragmatic 
evaluation. The agitation of Levellers’ (a 17th century 
political group that advocated for an extended franchise 
and other government reforms based on the inalienable 
of individual rights and the principle of popular 
sovereignty- Microsoft-Encarta, 2009) key theoretical 
moves which became popular during the English 
Civil War (17th century) centered around the mission 
to familiarize the accountable trust toward genuinely 
popular bodies and to transfer it from the domain of 
war and resistance to regular constitutional processes, 
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including elections. Record palpably proved that the 
Levellers initiated the appliance of accountability in the 
pursuit to have consolidated democracy through non-
electoral activities, especially audits and impeachments. 
Popular sovereignty, general participation, as well 
as other democratic monuments is necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for consolidating modern democratic 
governance; the principle of accountability is also 
considered necessary.
5 .  I N T E R N A L I N S T R U M E N T  F O R 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
To balance this discourse, a swift attempt shall be made to 
explain how internal/vertical model of accountability can 
orchestrate the government for the purpose of democratic 
consolidation. The most fundamental paradigmatic style 
of internal accountability has to do with the empowerment 
or ability of one part of (the same) government to check 
other entities (Rose-Ackerman, 2007). This glorifies a 
pragmatic and statutory division of governmental power 
via horizontal and vertical line. Sizeable degree of efforts 
has already been apportioned to the executive-legislative 
pattern of public finance regulation in this study. Thus, 
deliberate attention will briefly be given to certain official 
and non-official models through which accountability 
in public finance can be sought. Within this scope, the 
roles of Accountant-General Office, Auditor- General-
Office, Civil Societies Organisation and Mass Media are 
given reasonable treatment in regard to the possibility of 
accountability in management of public finance through 
them.
Aud i to r-Genera l ’s  o ff i ce  bas i ca l ly  ensu res 
accountability in public finance by rendering constant 
auditing of Federal and State’s accounts. The Auditor-
General’s Office in Nigeria is separate and entirely 
independent, whose powers, duties and status are 
stipulated in sections 85 (2, 4 and 6) of the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
Section 85 (2) highlights and expatiates the extent of 
the Office’s power viz: “That the public accounts of the 
federation and of all offices and courts of the federation 
shall be audited and reported by the Auditor-General 
who shall submit his report to the National Assembly” 
Section 85 (6) of 1999 constitution. Wynne (2007) 
further elaborated on the status of Auditor-General by 
asserting that he is “provided with the same level of 
protection as the president, that is, removable by a two 
third majority of the National Assembly. This symbolizes 
how sacred and important the issue of auditing-motivated 
accountability is to the Nigerian democratic project. In 
addition, section 85 (4) of the constitution categorically 
states that the Auditor-General “shall have power to 
conduct periodic checks on all Government statutory 
corporations, commissions, authorities, agencies 
including all persons and bodies established by an Act 
of the National Assembly”. Section 301 empowers the 
Auditor-General to audit the account of Area Council in 
the Federal Capital Territory.
Section 125 of the constitution also highlights the 
status of AGs for each of Nigeria’s 36 state governments. 
They enjoyed same level of cover/protection against 
dismissal as their federal counterparts. The appointment 
and dismissal is by a two third majority of the State 
House of Assembly on the recommendation of the 
State Governor (Wynne, 2011). This independent 
power configuration does not only allow the Auditor-
General’s offices to appoint its staff up to Grade Level 6, 
it gives it latitude to scrutinize the account, income and 
expenditure of Ministries, Departments and Agencies 
(MDAs). 
Also germane to ensure public accountability is the 
role of the Accountant-General’s Office. Some of its 
responsibilities include capturing of government revenue 
into the treasury and proper accounting, controlling 
government expenditure by way of collecting, collating 
and actual out-turn of expenditure, advising ministries and 
department on financial and accounting matters. 
A swift observation and realization of the role of the 
Accountant-General to oversee the implementation of 
budget further concretizes the causer effect of a well 
monitored budgeting, which is an integral component 
of constitutional democracy as far as the promotion 
of transparency and accountability in the management 
of public fund is concern. Also, it is an instrument for 
self-assessment within the frameworks of a democratic 
government (Gwegwe, 2010). The Financial (Control 
and Management) Act 1958 specifies and enjoins the 
Accountant-General to prepare the Financial Statement of 
all funds showing fully the financial position on the last of 
each financial year (Ofoegbu, 2003).
By the provision of Section 24 of the Act, the financial 
reports of the Accountant –General are to be submitted 
to the Auditor-General of the Federation without which 
the evaluation of prudent and transparent appreciation of 
financial resources would have been impossible (Ibid.). 
This process is enhanced by the provision of section 55 (5) 
of the 1999 Constitution.
Towards this end, it is clear that both accountability 
and democratization pursuit are two sides that must 
maintain a mutually reinforcing interaction for the 
purpose of ensuring the consolidation of the latter. It 
is understandably visible that a meaningful financial 
accountability can only emanate from a democratic 
environment where leaders derive their power from 
the people and the limits of their powers are shown 
by the constitution. On the other hand, democratic 
government will not assume its full and expected status 
in an atmosphere where financial accountability is not 
pervasive.
9 Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Apeloko D. Olubunmi; A. A. Adesopo (2017). 
Canadian Social Science, 13(11), 1-12
6. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
Table 1
The Role of Public Financial Accountability Institutions in the Consolidation of Democratic Governance Between 
1999 and 2013
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. deviation Variance
Consolidated democratic governance is a solution 
to poor welfare condition of citizen 425 1.00 5.00 861.00 2.0259 .85880 .738
Financial probity/accountability has enhanced 
transparency thereby consolidating democratic 
governance
423 1.00 5.00 949.00 2.2435 .94633 .896
Financial probity ensures proper execution of 
governmnet projects by MDAs thus promoting 
democratic governance
418 1.00 5.00 838.00 2.0048 .87050 .758
Transparent financial management engenders 
popular support for government 421 1.00 5.00 885.00 2.1021 1.01020 1.020
Transparent	financial	affairs	can	provoke	general	
participation of citizen in politics 423 1.00 5.00 1036.00 2.4492 1.23213 1.518
Source: Field Survey, 2015.
6.1 Hypothesis Testing
A null hypothesis is tested on the significance of the role 
played by public financial accountability institutions in 
the three states. Table over shows the Chi-square values 
used to test the hypothesis. The null hypothesis is stated 
as:
H0: The public financial accountability institutions in 
Ekiti, Osun and Ogun States did not play a significant role 
in the consolidation of democratic governance. 
Using Chi-square test to test Hypothesis 1
Chi-square (X2) calculated is given as 
Σ [ (oi – ei)2 ]
Ei
Where oi is the observed frequency and ei is the 
expected frequency
X 2calculated = 113.97
Degree of freedom = 4 – 1 = 3
X 2tab at 5% significance level = 7.815
Since X 2calculated > X 2tab, we reject H0 and accept 
its alternative.
Therefore, we conclude that the public financial 
accountability institutions in the States played a significant 
role in the consolidation of democratic governance.
6.2 Analysis 
There was a popular opinion among questionnaire and 
interview respondents that consolidated democratic 
governance is a solution to poor welfare condition of 
citizen. Within a range of response value between 1 and 
5, since the mean score is (2.02) and standard deviation 
(0.858); a conclusion can be drawn that consolidated 
democratic governance is a solution to poor welfare 
condition of the citizen. It was however asserted that 
as a result of the role of public financial accountability 
institutions in Ekiti, Osun and Ogun, financial probity/
accountability has enhanced transparency thereby 
consolidating democratic governance. This position was 
verified by a second to the highest sum score of 949 with 
a variance of (0.896).
In a similar manner, it was equally showed that 
financial probity ensured proper execution of government 
projects by MDAs thus promoting democratic governance 
with mean value (2.00) and standard deviation (0.758). 
It is thus concluded by the study that financial probity 
ensured proper execution of government projects by 
MDAs and subsequently promoted democratic governance 
in the three States of the study.
Another major role of public financial accountability 
institutions in the consolidation of democratic governance 
in Ekiti, Osun and Ogun during the period under 
study was institutionalisation of transparent financial 
management, which engenders popular support for 
governments in the States. As shown in table above, more 
respondents tended towards agreement than disagreement 
to the assertion that public financial accountability 
institutions in the States promoted transparent financial 
management, which subsequently engendered popular 
support for governments, as shown by mean value (2.10) 
and standard deviation (1.02). The question of whether 
or not transparent financial affairs could provide general 
participation of the citizen in politics was answered in 
the highest sum score of 1,036. From the analysis above, 
the study accepts the position of the majority that public 
financial accountability institutions in Ekiti, Osun and 
Ogun States promoted peaceful co-existence of the 
stakeholders.
The roles of the financial accountability institutions 
in the three states had a remarkable influence on 
consolidation of democracy, particularly in relation to 
the welfare conditions of the inhabitants of the states, 
participation in politics/support for government, peaceful 
co-existence of the citizens and speedy execution of 
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projects. The financial accountability mechanisms 
equally aided the roles of the institutions to consolidate 
democracy in the States. This is obvious in the case of 
Ogun State, which was earlier described as having the 
most robust mechanisms. According to a respondent, 
since the emergence of democratic rule, there have been 
tremendous improvements in the treatment of financial 
transactions in Ogun State, particularly through the 
Accountant-General and Ministry of Finance cum other 
institutions. He stated further thus:
The present dispensation in Ogun State could be seen as one 
of the leading states that believes in good record keeping and 
that have entrenched themselves into the financial standards 
that have been known globally. Ogun State is one of the few 
states that have complied with the details of ‘IPSAT. The State, 
during the forum of the accountant general of the federation 
in 2014 was adjudged as an exemplary state to others; its 
financial statements are computerized and well outlined with 
good structures put in place to deploy various aspect of the 
document.
Corroborating the above, two respondents declared 
that, anyone who has been to Ogun State within the 
last 5 years can testify to the good developments there. 
According to them, when a leader exalts probity, 
corruption will be minimized and that there will be 
enough to touch the people in terms of service delivery 
which is the dividends of democracy. 
It was a unanimous view of the interviewees that 
when measures were applied to block leakages, less 
would be spent and cost would be saved, and in effect 
having more to be diverted into some other needs 
of the society and in addition creating avenue for 
future projects and programmes for the populace. The 
respondents across the states agreed to the above claim 
and went further to reiterate the fact that financial 
accountability in the states had resulted in more physical 
projects, which invariably promoted peoples’ welfare 
and consolidated democratic governance. A respondent 
specifically posited that there is always a nexus between 
financial accountability and the welfare condition of 
the people and that where leaders are of impeccable 
characters, corruption will be minimized thereby leading 
to increase in the money that will be available for the 
common good of the people. 
Other impacts of the role of financial accountability 
institutions on consolidation of democratic governance 
in the three states were further revealed during the 
interviews. One of these is the fact that there has been an 
obvious impact of financial accountability on the lives of 
the people. This engenders developments such as feeding 
the students with quality food, construction of roads, 
bridges etc. Equally, accountability/proper probity has 
boosted the confidence of the stakeholders to rely on the 
financial information and the general performance of the 
government. It also allows the States to tap into other 
advantageous areas. For instance, collection of the bond 
is made easy due to good financial statement which made 
them credit worthy. 
All the democratic essences of financial accountability 
have received adequate attention from scholars given the 
need to curb corruption. In fact, it is important to allude 
to the assertion of Maduagwu (1996) who noted that 
the two most disastrous obstacles to democratization 
in Nigeria have been military and corruption. At 
least, the demise of military autocracy in Nigeria has 
automatically enthroned corruption as the only fear along 
the path to ensure that democratic values are deepened. 
More elaborately, Rose-Ackerman (2007) opines that 
government corruption involves the illegal use of public 
power for private or political gain. This can manifests in 
various guises viz: 
Public officials with the power to dispense benefits or impose 
costs may use their positions corruptly aggressively to seek 
private advantage or accept covert payments offered by private 
actors. Corruption may be an occasional exception to the rule of 
law or a routine aspect of the way officials, politicians, and the 
private sector deal with each other. The problem is most serious 
when payoffs and self-dealing are an integral part of the way a 
system works. In such cases, the occasional “big case” designed 
to punish a “bad apple” is not sufficient; more fundamental 
reforms are needed to restructure the relationships between the 
public and private sectors. (p.190)
Mauro (1995), Wei (2000), and Friedman (2000) have 
clearly referred to fundamental effects of corruption on 
the democratic project. Their reflections parade issues like 
limitation of economic growth via distortion of foreign 
direct investment, encouragement or growth of illegal 
businesses which sometimes undermines the capacity 
of the state to collect taxes and enforce regulatory and 
expenditure plans with justice, and it challenge the 
legitimacy of the democratic experiment by reducing 
public trust in government. Citizens may begin to view 
all political participants as tainted and hence may limit 
their involvement in the project of state building and 
democratic question. Indeed, such disheartened citizens 
may also engage in corrupt practices out of sarcasm 
and hopelessness. This clearly buttresses the assertion 
of respondents that financial accountability will fuel 
participation and support for the government. 
The foregoing has clearly revealed that relationships 
exist between an environment where there is corruption 
or otherwise (financial accountability) and democratic 
governance. The focus therefore is in attempts to stamp 
out corruption. In line with this study, the kind of 
governmental inadequacies that breed corruption include 
buying of goods and services, distribution of subsidies, 
bidding for and execution of projects, privatization of 
state firms, provision of concessions (Ackerman, 2007) 
and utilization of public finance. 
 The realization that excellent investors will not invest 
in an atmosphere that lacks accountability and joined with 
the fact that potentiality of lack of accountability destroys 
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the value of every business, and possibly fuel resentment 
constitute part of the reasons for instituting sophisticated 
measures to ensure that financial accountability 
is guaranteed. This is in line with the assertion of 
questionnaire and interview respondents who opined that 
the role of financial accountability institutions will lead to 
peaceful co-existence. 
Among the numerous damages that can ensue from 
the financial mismanagement, the inefficiency as a result 
of corruption, which will enable the highest bribe giver 
and most unscrupulous individual/firm to win a contract 
to the chagrin of the populace vis-à-vis the inability 
of the government to execute developmental projects. 
This account for the unanimous agreement among 
respondents who stated that financial accountability will 
make more money available for other programs of the 
government. Thus, there is agreement among the views 
of interview and questionnaire respondents as well as 
the opinions of scholars who have theorized financial 
accountability issues and those who have conducted 
empirical studies. 
CONCLUSION
The s tudy concluded that  there  were  f inancia l 
accountability institutions and mechanisms in all the 
sampled states through which democratic consolidation 
was ensured at different degrees. But the degrees of 
outcomes from their roles were dependent on some 
inherent factors within the states, such as: Leadership 
quality of the executive head, rate of party and personality 
turn-over, political will of the leaders to curb corruption.
REFERENCES
Agbaje ,  A.  (1996) .  Pol i t ical  par t ies ,  corrupt ion and 
democratisation. In A. Gboyega (Ed.), Corruption 
and democratisation in Nigeria. Ibadan: Agbo Areo 
publisher. 
Antonio, O. C.,  & Marcello,  B. L. (2007). Executive 
legislative relations and democratic consolidation: 
A review and some questions. In I.  D. Jorge & J. 
Anthony (Eds.) ,  The consti tution of  democracy – 
lesson from practice and research .  John Hopkins 
University Press.
Ayeni, J. (2008). Reforming public service in Nigeria: A collective 
responsibility. Wuse-Abuja: SSC Publisher.
Benard, A., Przeworski, A., & Stokes, C. S. (1999). Election and 
representation. In A. Przeworski et al. (Eds.), Democracy, 
accountability and representation. United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Behn, R. D. (2001). Rethinking democratic accountability. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Boven, M. ( 2007). Two concepts of accountability. Utrecht 
University Press.
Chiebub, J. A., & Przeworski, A. (1999). Democrecy, 
elections and accountabilityfor economic outscomes. In 
A. Przewarski, S. Stokes, & A. Benard (Eds.), Democracy, 
accountability and representation. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Day, P., & Klein, R. (1987). Accountabilities: Five public 
services. London: Tavistock Publisher.
Della-Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (1999). Corrupt exchanges: 
Actors, resources, and mechanisms of political corruption. 
New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Fiorina, M. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national 
elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Friedman, T. L. (2000). The Lexus and the olive tree. New York: 
Farrar Straus Giroux.
Grzegorz, E., & Grnymala-Busse, A. (2007). Strengthening 
pluralism and public participation. In J. I. Dominquez & 
A. Jones (Eds.), New democracies in the construction of 
democracy: Lessons from practice and research. The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Gboyega, A. (1996). Corruption and democratisation in Nigeria, 
1983-1993: An overview. In A. Gboyega (Ed.), Corruption 
and democratisation in Nigeria. Ibadan: Agbo Areo 
Publisher.
Key, V.O. (1966). The responsible electorate. New York: Vintage 
Books.
Lerner, D. (1958). The passing of traditional society. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Luckham, R. (1971). The Nigerian military: A sociological 
analysis of authority and revolt, 1960-1967. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Maduagwu, M. O. (1996). Nigeria in search for political culture: 
The political class, corruption and democratisation. In A. 
Gboyega (Ed.), Corruption and democratisation in Nigeria. 
Ibadan: Agbo Areo Publisher.
Makinde, J. T. (2003). Philosophical approach to the problem 
of ethics and accountability in the Nigerian public service. 
In O. E. Ezeani (Ed.), Public accountability in Nigeria: 
Perspectives and issues. Enugu, Academic Publishing 
Company.
Ogban-Iyan, O. (1996). The National assembly, corruption and 
democratisation. In A. Gboyega (Ed.), Corruption and 
democratisation in Nigeria. Ibadan: Agbo Areo Publisher.
Oyebode,  A.  (1996) .  The Judic iary,  Corrupt ion  and 
Democratisation. In A. Gboyega (Ed.), Corruption 
and democratisation in Nigeria. Ibadan: Agbo Areo 
Publisher.
Paldam, M. (1991). How robust is the vote function? A study 
of seventeen nations over two decades. In H. Norpoth, M. 
Lewis-Beck, & J.-D. Lafay (Eds.), Economics and politics: 
The calculus of support (pp.9-32). Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press.
Pruffer, J. (2012). Institutions and economic governance. 
Netherland: Tilburg University Press.
Przeworski, A. (1999). Minimalist conception of democracy: A 
defense. Cambridge: Cambridge University Publisher.
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Public Financial Accountability Institutions 
and Democratic Governance in Nigeria
12
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: 
Causes, consequences, and reform. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2002). Corruption and the criminal law: 
Forum on crime and society. United Kingdom. Cambridge 
University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2007). Controlling corruption: Government 
accountability, business ethics and sectoral reform. In I. 
D. Jorge & J. Anthony (Eds.), The democracy- lesson from 
practices and research. John Hopkins University Press.
Siollun, M. (2009). Oil, politics and violence: Nigeria’s 
military coup culture 1966-1976. New York: Algora 
Publishing. 
Utomi, P., Duncan, A., & Williams, G. (2007). Nigeria and the 
political economy of reform: Strengthening the incentives 
for economic growth. The Policy Practice Limited, 33 
Southdown Avenue, Brighton BN1 6EH, UK.
Yorom, J. G. (1994). Colonial legacy, violence and democracy 
in Nigeria: The case of middle-belt states. Benin City: Hima 
and Hima Ltd.
